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ABSTRACT 
 
The maritime industry provides an efficient method of transporting large volumes of basic 
commodities and finished products, with more than one-third of all international seaborne 
trade consisting of dry bulk cargo. Historically, the period that preceded the global 
financial crisis was characterized by accelerated growth, which culminated with the 
historic high point in the dry bulk freight market recorded during the second quarter of 
2008. However, since mid-2008, the dry bulk sector presents high volatility, reflecting 
both lower demand for maritime transport and increase of the expected capacity.Within 
this framework, commercial banks, being the main source of financing for the shipping 
market, which is characterised by high capital and operating costs, have significantly 
reduced the volume of loans granted in the industry. The latter is of particular importance 
considering the recent regulatory framework for banks apllied by the Basel III that limits 
the exposure of banks in sectors, like dry bulk shipping, that present high risk rate. 
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ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL CRISIS RESULTS ON DRY BULK MARKET & 
FINANCING 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Seaborne trade contributes in the transport of huge volumes of dry bulk freights, 
consisting of iron ore, coal and other raw materials, as well as raw materials for nutrition 
in bulk (cereal, fruits etc.). Historically, the time period that preceded the global financial 
crisis was characterized by an accelerated growth that managed a boom, which led to the 
most impressive economic cycle in the recent maritime history. Its peak was the historic 
high level of freight rates in the dry bulk market, which took place during the second 
quarter of 2008 (400% over the 10-year annual average). The main factors that played a 
role in this unprecedented increase – especially in the dry bulk freight market – were the 
accelerated development rates of the emerging economies (China, India, Brazil, Russia, 
and other countries of SE Asia), which when combined with the relative lack of available 
capacity led the freight rates (especially in the dry bulk market) in unprecedented heights. 
The rapid increase of investments and of production in the emerging economies led to the 
rapid increase of the bulk of worldwide trade and to the sudden increase of the demand 
for seaborne trade from both sides of the production process (countries that export basic 
raw materials- emerging economies). 
However, from the mid-2008, the oceangoing shipping sector or, to be more specific, the 
dry bulk transport sector, showed signs of recession and significant volatility, reflecting 
the increase of demand for seaborne transport and the unsurprising increase of the offered 
capacity. Within this framework, commercial banks, being the main financial supply body 
that provides the resources necessary in a market characterized by its high capital and 
operational cost and also by high risk, due to the significant volatility, cut the number of 
investment loans for the sector back in a great extend. Also, in the latter contributed the 
application of the Basel Accord ΙΙΙ, which limits the exposure of banks in certain sectors 
(the shipping and airline industry are such sectors), the loan portfolios of which, after the 
outbreak of the global financial crisis, appear to be mostly problematic.  
 
 
2. SHIPPING MARKET CHARACTERISTICs: LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
Regardless of the type of goods transported, the shipping market is comprised of four sub-
markets (Stopford 1997), namely the shipbuilding market, the freight market (commercial 
exploitation of ships), the sale and purchase market (S&P, second-hand ships) and the 
demolition market, where, depending on the strategic planning of the maritime company 
and the shipping market conditions prevailing from time to time, a ship (main asset) 
reaches the end of its life-cycle. These sub-markets are directly interrelated and any 
developments in one of them may have an impact on one or more of the others, e.g. an 
increase in freight rates is bound to affect both the S&P market and the shipbuilding 
market (Kavussanos and Alizadeh 2002), given that supply actors have positive 
expectations of a further increase in demand and, by extension, of improved financial 
results in the industry. In implementing their investment plans (whether relating to 
shipbuilding or the purchase of second-hand ships), supply actors seek borrowing 
primarily from the banks, which in turn gain knowledge of the prevailing market 
conditions and assess any optimistic expectations extremely carefully, given the size of 
borrowing in the shipping sector, which is a capital-intensive market.   
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At the same time, given that the demand for available capacity emerges from and is 
almost exclusively perceived as a derivative demand in the international commerce, 
shipping market analysis is essentially connected to the analysis of international 
commercial and industrial operations, which are served by the merchant shipping and the 
developments of which have a direct and decisive impact on the shipping industry and, by 
extension, on the banks' positive response in granting the necessary loan capital.  
In assessing the special features of the shipping market, any developments in either the 
internal (four sub-markets) or the external environment (international economic 
developments, international commerce) of the shipping market contribute to the creation 
of the shipping cycles (Metaxas 1971; Stopford 2009; Bijwaard and Knapp 2009), which 
are quite different in terms of both duration and periodicity. In particular, external factors 
relating to the structure of global economy may be positively or negatively limited to the 
demand for maritime transports, which is in turn reflected on positive or negative freight 
rate variations. These factors are classified in two basic categories (Zuellig 1942; Faust 
1976): 
i) Those caused by social forces, and  
ii) Those caused by natural forces.  
 A study of international economic relations essentially involves political assessments, 
given that production factors present international mobility and shipping production is 
becoming globalised (Laos 2003). The demand for transportation services is affected by 
unforeseen developments in the international political environment. The French-German 
war in 1837, the economic crash in 1929, the Korean war in 1950, the Suez crisis in 1956, 
the Gulf War, the war in Iraq, the insurrection in the Arab world, particularly in Libya in 
2010 - 2011 etc., have all had an impact on the supply and demand for maritime 
transports and, inevitably, on freight rates. At the same time, economic changes, 
particularly economic shocks, lead to a sharp increase in the demand for capacity on one 
part and to an excessive stand-still on the other. Consequently, this leads to extreme 
freight rate variations (Lorange P., Fjeldstat O. 2010), which clearly have to be taken 
seriously into account by shipping operators as they have a direct impact on ship values.  
Taking into consideration the above, the main factor for the emergence and the 
development of the shipping cycles, is the relationship between supply and demand for 
capacity, which in its turn is a derivative demand of the global supply and demand for 
goods. Moreover, there exists no way to foresee the form and duration of every shipping 
cycle, which in combination with the significant variability of freight rates, presents risks 
for the bodies involved in the shipping market, in the full spectrum of their operational 
decisions. Said risks are distinguished into the financial risks of the market (market risk) 
based on the developments of the global financial activity, into credit risk and into 
operational risk, which are related to the ship’s yield and to the everyday operation of the 
shipping company. 
The major risks (Sambracos E. & Maniati M. 2013) relating to the particularities of the 
shipping market, which reflect all findings of the shipping market analysis, may be 
summarized as follows:  
 
A. Market Risks:  
1. Freight variability in short time periods (within a week) 
2. Shifting towards purchases of ships of different capacity 
3. Total income variability 
4. Fuel price variability 
5. Running costs variability 
6. Geographic variations of freight in respect of ships of the same capacity 
4 
7. Locality of the supply/demand balance  
8. Newly-built ship price variability 
9. Second-hand / newly-built ship price variability in short periods of time  
10. Asset (ships) price variability 
11. Scrap price variability (determines the withdrawal of any excessive capacity, which 
affects the supply balance) 
12. Variability due to technological developments / adjustments affecting operating or 
capital costs 
13. Variability due to changes in the institutional framework, affecting the factors that 
determine operating costs 
14. Financial risks and selection of loan currency 
15. Loan interest rate variability 
16. Exchange rate variability (particularly where loan payments and collections take 
place in different currencies) 
17. Annual maintenance cost variability, in the context of the operational management 
policy applied by each ship owner 
18. Market variability due to weather conditions 
19. Market variability due to political developments 
20. Market variability due to natural disasters 
 
B. Credit Risks. 
1. Counter party's solvency (default risk). This risk relates to all forms of default 
(technical, financial, failure to make interest or capital payments for a long period of time, 
etc). 
2. Exposure Risk. This refers to the borrower's overall exposure to risk and his shipping 
portfolio diversification.  
3. Recovery Risk. This refers to the level of security of the financial institution in case 
of default (or insolvency) of the borrower. This risk is particularly difficult to determine 
given that the prices of assets normally serving as security are constantly changing and 
depend on one or more market risks. This risk includes also the legal risks involved in the 
transaction procedure.  
4. Credit Spread Risk. It relates to risks arising from the increase in credit spreads, 
especially in cases where a secondary market has developed and prices are constantly 
determined in terms of market values (mark to market). 
5. Maintaining liquidity margins and applying cyclical /counter-cyclical policies (the 
tendency to follow the cycle or apply a mixed investment and disinvestment strategy) 
6. The ship owner's policy as regarding his participation in asset management practices 
or his orientation towards chartering and the operating yield of assets.  
7. The ship owners' and ship managers' policy towards preserving general and instant 
liquidity and cash flows. 
8. Ship owners' policy in terms of long-term borrowing potentials 
9. Ship owners' policy in terms of financial leverage  
10. Ship's yield and employment during one year.  
11. Ship managers' policy as to the type of chartering applied (time charter, voyage 
charter etc.)  
Under these circumstances of high volatility and high risks, the main reason for the 
interrelated and interdependent relationship among commerce, industry, activity, 
purchases of dematerialized securities, financial markets and commodities, is the effort of 
the managers of capitals to profit and to extend said profit from their participation in 
them. On the other hand, the involvement of financing bodies and, most importantly, of 
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banks in high risk markets characterized by multidimentional parameters that have to be 
taken into consideration, proved that it may not lead to the repayment of the respective 
obligations, especially when the loan has already been received just before the outbreak 
of a period of global financial crisis, like the one that is still running from 2008 until 
today. 
 
 
3. THE DRY BULK MARKET BEFORE AND AFTER THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS 
 
In the dry bulk market, the rapid increase of investments and of production in the 
emerging economies led to the accelerated growth of the volume of global commerce, and 
to the sudden increase of the demand for seaborne transport from both sides of the 
production process (countries that export basic raw materials-emerging economies). From 
a developmental point of view, the average annual growth of the international dry bulk 
freight  commerce during the 1989 – 2009 period was 3,6%, when the respective average 
annual growth during the 2003-2008 period (before the influence of the global financial 
crisis in shipping) was  5,09%.  
The outbreak of the financial crisis, that caused the development of seaborne trade to 
present significantly negative variation rates, led the shipowners to cancel their orders 
(especially in the market sub-category Handysize),this way reducing the size of  excessive 
capacity when compared to the corresponding size that was expected (according to the 
orders’ book). Additional balancing mechanisms in the liquid bulk market that 
contributed to the decline of the available capacity (which, during the time of crisis was in 
particularly high levels), are the existence of delays in the ships’ unloading process due to 
the increased traffic in the ports of China, as well as the increase of the rate of destruction 
of the dry bulk ships, especially those that surpass 25 years of age and those that have 
smaller carrying capacity. In order to explain this further, the development of capacity 
offered per market sub-category in seaborne dry bulk freight transport, is presented on the 
following Figure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1, Development of Offered Capacity in the Dry Bulk Freight Market (1970 –
2010) 
Source: Data processing by Clarkson Research (Shipping Review Database, 2010) 
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By examining the data presented in the corresponding Figure, the gradual increase of the 
offered capacity emerges in all sub-categories, with the exception of the capacity sub-
category Handysize. The Handysize ship category, because of its features (smaller 
transport ability), seems to be more directly affected and led to dissolution from the 
negative effects of the seaborne trade. In addition, this particular ship category is more 
easily led to dissolution, if one takes into account its inability to find freight during times 
of crisis, when compared to the larger carrying capacity ships that have more chances to 
achieve at least their underemployment, covering at least a part of their operational costs 
until the recovery of the charter market. In the December of 2008 (when the crisis was at 
its peak with freight rates scoring a negative record), the total capacity came that came to 
dissolution amounted to 2,87 million dwt. , from which 0,360 million dwt. accounted to 
Handymax ships (percentage 12,5%  of the total of dismantled ships) and  1,352 million 
dwt. to Handysize ships (percentage 47% of the total of dismantled ships). 
Despite the cancelling of orders aiming to limit the offered capacity and also to activate 
additional balancing mechanisms (ships’ dismantling), imbalance is still present in the 
market. In the Figure that follows, the offered capacity variation rate is displayed (in dwt.) 
in relation to the respective variation rate of seaborne dry bulk freight transport, where 
from 2008 there seems to be a notable increase rate of offered capacity in relation to the 
respective increase rate of seaborne dry bulk freight transport, leading the overall levels 
of the charter market into substantial decline.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Percentage Variation of Offered Capacity and Seaborne Dry Bulk Freight 
Trade (1986 – 2009) 
Source: Data processing by Clarkson Research (Shipping Review Database, 2010) 
 
The imbalance between supply and demand in the dry bulk freight market is also reflected 
on the charter market. Freight rates in the dry bulk market exhibit equally strong 
variability (Figure 3), affecting the formulation of the total income from the operational 
exploitation of ships in said market, but also the ability or not, to cover both the 
obligatory operational costs and the required loan installments.  
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Figure 3 Development of Freight Rate Indices in the Dry Bulk market (Baltic Dry 
Index
1,
 Baltic Freight Index
2
, Baltic Supramax Index, Baltic Handysize Index, 1999 - 
2010) 
Source: Data processing by Clarksons Intelligence Network, 2010 
 
Besides the volatility of the charter market, the ships’ values present high variability too 
(whether newly built or second-hand). To provide an example, it is known that in 2001, 
the prices of new constructions were estimated to be on an average of $39 million for 
Capesize, $21 million for Panamax and $19,8 million for Handymax ships. Within a five-
year period, in 2006, the new constructions’ prices had almost doubled and were 
estimated to be on an average of $62,8 million for Capesize, $36,6 million for Panamax 
and of $32,6 million for Handymax ships. The highest prices for newly built dry bulk 
ships were noted on August 2008 (when the charter market had also noted its highest 
prices at the same time period, under a periodic survey) with the prices being formed into 
$99 million for Capesize, $55 million for Panamax and into $48,5 million for Handymax 
ships. Shortly afterwards, the values of new constructions plummeted (Figure 4) with 
small fluctuations, reflecting without notable delay the course of the charter market. The 
prices of second-hand ships followed a similar course, the value of which is declining 
since the outbreak of the global financial crisis. 
  
                                                          
1 The Baltic Dry Index (dry bulk index) is an index that receives daily rates from the Baltic Exchange Stockmarket 
which is based in London. This particular index offers evaluation for the seaborne transport freight rates, of the most 
important raw materials. For the computation of this index, 26 sea routes (ship routes) are assessed together and they are 
measured by taking into account time schedules and distances. This index includes ships, Handymax, Panamax, and 
Capesize carrying dry bulk, which transfer cargoes like coal, iron ore , grain etc. 
2 The Baltic Freight Index (BFI) was created on the 4th of January 1985 for the Baltic Exchange of London (freight 
rates’ ‘stockmarket’). This index shows the everyday average of the given freight rates for specific dry bulk markets. In 
reality, this is a combination that includes voyage and time charters that are valued depending on the importance of 
every purchase. The composition of this index aims to the better representation of the total and of the response in spot 
variations. 
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Figure 4, Development of Prices Concerning Newly-Built Dry Bulk Ships (1990-
2010) 
Source: Data processing by Clarkson Research (Shipping Review Database, 2010) 
 
With the decline of the income of maritime enterprises for granted, after the outbreak of 
the globall financial crisis, the phenomenon of the inability of loan servicing was 
observed, with the banks being left exposed, because, besides the fact that loans were not 
repayed, the value of a ship under mortgage is significantly lower than the value of 
ownership or shipbuilding, as the latter is formed based on the developments of the 
supply and demand for capacity at a specific moment in time. This fact led the banks to 
limit the loans that would be granted for the maritime industry, a trend that was reinforced 
by the application of the Basel Accord ΙΙΙ. 
 
 
4. THE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN BORROWING 
AND IN THE BANKS’ OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Due to the global financial crisis, fluctuations in freight rates and yields in the shipping 
markets naturally lead to a constant evaluation and re-evaluation of the investment and 
disinvestment in the industry, hence shifting liquidity, which in turn leads to a credit 
crunch. Today, shipping is in a slight credit crunch due to capital flight, in conjunction 
with the over-supply of available capacity, low yields and low yield expectations; as a 
result, investors and credit institutions show little interest in the shipping sector as they 
see limited potential of maximizing their yields to the benefit of their investors and 
shareholders.  
This is also reflected in the size of shipping financing which has been constantly dropping 
over the last years (Figure 5) (Antoniou H. 2010), while a significant portion relates to re-
financing of existing loans. In 2009, when the drop in the freight market caused a 
significant drop in the cash flows of maritime enterprises, the re-financing of existing 
syndicated loans reached 43.55% of total shipping financing. 
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Figure 5 Volume of shipping financing (Syndicated loans, 2005 – 2009) 
Shipping Forum 2010, 23 February 2010 
Source: Harris Antoniou, The New Normal in Shipping Finance, Capital Link Greek 
 
Furthermore, the prevailing uncertainty and ever-changing physical and financial markets 
have forced investors to defend against continuous risks through a commonly acceptable 
framework of rules governing primarily the operations of banking institutions. In this 
context, the Basel Accord was drafted (by the Basel Committee) laying down common 
rules with a view to ensuring the capital adequacy of banking institutions. The need for 
capital adequacy has led to the enforcement of relevant rules originally in 1988, and their 
subsequent amendment under the Basel Accord ("Basel Ι"). Considering, however, that 
this framework was incapable of providing the necessary level of security, it has lead 
inevitably to "Basel II", a set of even stricter rules on capital adequacy. Understanding the 
need for a readjustment of the rules of Basel II, the international regulators have 
introduced an amendment thereto (known as Basel ΙΙΙ) which forces banking institutions 
to retain a larger amount of equity in order to deal with possible financial crises, whether 
due to poor customer selection (poor structuring and internal evaluation systems) or poor 
selection of financial products (e.g. government bonds of states facing the possibility of a 
bankruptcy). Under the new requirements for a customized approach of financing 
components and policies (Basel ΙΙ and ΙΙΙ), every banking institution should evaluate both 
credit and operating-risk parameters and market risk parameters.  
The set of upgraded rules introduced under the Basel Accord has raised concern in the 
shipping sector, as the Accord is intended to minimize recent risks whether relating to 
inefficient portfolios or otherwise, or even limit its exposure to particular sectors (such as 
the shipping and airline industries) and achieve a much improved capital adequacy in both 
qualitative and quantitative terms. 
Furthermore, shipping portfolios (just like airline portfolios) are currently among the least 
attractive ones in the international financial system, owing to a number of reasons. One of 
the most important reasons relates to the term of financing duration. In the shipping 
industry the term of financing duration ranges on average from five to ten years in respect 
of banking institutions granting facilities up to $30,000,000 - 40,000,000. It is noted that 
in the case of syndicated loans, the amount of the facility may reach $500 million. This 
fact places the shipping industry at the centre of the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) in 
Basel ΙΙΙ, which is one of the two liquidity indicators adopted under the Basel Accord that 
sets a minimum amount of standard financing in respect of each bank, based on the bank's 
10 
yearly liquidity over assets. In conclusion, if a bank offers long-term loan facilities to its 
customers it must either ensure on a directly proportional long-term basis an increase in 
retail deposits or issue debt securities, which is currently considered to be extremely 
difficult. According to the information supplied by Dealogic, the above deficit has 
dropped from 1.3 trillion Dollars in 2009 to 906 billion Dollars in 2011. 
Thus, for many banks which have been engaging in shipping financing until now this 
means higher costs or even higher risk or increased capital obligations, which makes them 
more reserved towards shipping financing. Moreover, capital pricing and the cost of 
capital in shipping financing are also expected to have a negative impact, as the costs 
arising from the customized monitoring of borrowers will be somehow compensated.  
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
According to the longitudinal analysis of the dry bulk freight market one is able to 
perceive the diversity of the factors that interact in order to each time formulate the 
freight value rates and the fixed assets. The most crucial factors from those interact either 
directly or indirectly, affecting the decisions of financial institutions, in order to prompt 
them to finance them or to set financing parameters (leverage ratio, loan duration, 
repayment conditions etc.). Said reasons render the shipping market to be perhaps the 
most challenging, speaking from a predictability and modeling point of view, when it 
comes to a having single model that could reflect the total risk with credibility.  
The fluctuations of freight rates and yields in the dry bulk freight shipping market, led to 
a continuous specification and re-specification of the investment and disinvestment from 
the sector, with the consequence of the transfering of liquidity from one purchase to 
another, or more often from one market category to others, causing as a result credit 
crunch to branches that happen to be, at the same time, affected from constant depression. 
Today, shipping is in a relative credit crunsh situation from the capital flight, by cause of 
a combination of oversupply, available capacity, low yields and equally low expectations 
for future yield, and as a result it will not draw the attention of investors and of financial 
institutions, which in their turn aim for the maximization of yields for the benefit of their 
investors and shareholders. 
Moreover, based on the current demand for a personalized approach of data and of 
governmental financing (Basel ΙΙ and ΙΙ), every financial banking institution should take 
into account the parameters that set the credit risk, the operational risk and also the ones 
that set the market risk. 
      The increased cost provision of the loan agreement, that remains inactive until this 
day, is expected to concern the signatory parties and will develop into a legal interest 
field. The most direct issue which both borrowers and creditors will have to deal with in 
the near future (which of course, they already do), is about the understanding of the 
conditions under which the signatory parties will have to continue their operations . Of 
course, the possibility of the withdrawal of banks from the field is still open (up to now 
important portfolios have been withdrawn), for the benefit of Asian governmental 
economies that offer an alternative approach in the worldwide shipping industry. If the 
banking sector does not wish to lose the shipping sector, despite the fact that the latter 
proved to be damaging for banking institutions in many periods, however yielded 
significant capital gains in other times, then, there should be found a commonly accepted 
framework of understanding and consultation for the content, the form, and the elements 
that contribute to the calculation of the credit and market risk in the shipping industry. 
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